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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
Case No:  02-4539
ARTHUR KANGER; SILVIA KANGER;
DELIA KANGER; JULIA KANGER,
                    Petitioners
            v.
JOHN ASHCROFT, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF
THE UNITED STATES AND THE IMMIGRATION
AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE,
                    Respondent
PETITION FOR REVIEW OF THE DECISION
OF THE BOARD OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS
Nos. A29 833 313, A29 833 412
A70 867 836, A70 867 837
Submitted Pursuant to LAR 34.1(a)
November 3, 2003
Before: McKEE, SMITH and WEIS, Circuit Judges
(Filed November 7, 2003)
_________________
OPINION OF THE COURT
_________________
SMITH, Circuit Judge.
Arthur Kanger and his wife Silvia appeal from an order by the Board of
Immigration Appeals (“BIA”), affirming the denial by the Immigration Judge (“IJ”) of
    1Their children, Delia and Julia, did not file applications for asylum themselves. 
Accordingly, their claims are dependent on those of their parents pursuant to 8 U.S.C. §
1158(b)(3).
    2We have jurisdiction to review the BIA’s order pursuant to INA § 242(a), 8 U.S.C. §
1252(a); see also Abdulai v. Ashcroft, 239 F.2d 542, 549 n.2 (3d Cir. 2001). 
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their applications for asylum and withholding of removal under the Immigration and
Nationality Act  (“INA”) and for relief under the United Nations Convention Against
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (“CAT”).1 
For the reasons set forth below, we will affirm.2
The Kangers arrived in the United States from the former Soviet Socialist Republic 
of Latvia in January 1991.  According to Mr. Kanger, the primary reason for leaving
Latvia was “to save [his] family and [him]self from persecution from Latvian Soviet
Police and KGB.”  AR 327.  Consistent with this objective, the Kangers overstayed their
30 day visitor visa and Mr. Kanger filed an application for asylum on April 30, 1991.  
Although Latvia gained its independence from the former Soviet Union in August 1991,
the Kangers did not return.  Finally, in March 1998, the Kangers were served with
Notices to Appear which charged them with overstaying their visitor status.  
On December 18, 1998, Mr. Kanger supplemented his 1991 asylum application
with a sworn statement that added a claim for asylum on the basis of past persecution
because he was perceived as a Jew and was a member of the non-Latvian ethnic minority. 
Mr. Kanger also asserted that he would be persecuted on this basis if he were returned to
Latvia.  In addition, he expressed a fear of future persecution by former police and KGB
3officials based on his knowledge of their unlawful conduct before Latvia obtained its
independence and his support, along with his wife’s, of the Latvian independence
movement.  
The Kangers conceded their deportability during a hearing before the IJ, but they
contested the allegation in the Notices to Appear that they were citizens of Latvia. 
During the pendency of their applications before the IJ, Mrs. Kanger filed an application
for asylum which sought asylum based on her husband’s application and because she was
“afraid for [her] safety and that of [her] children.”  In her testimony before the IJ, Mrs.
Kanger affirmed that she became aware of the fact that she was of Jewish descent only
after she arrived in the United States and was informed that her brother, who had lived in
Latvia, had been killed.  She testified that his body was found with the Star of David
allegedly carved into it by a knife.  Mrs. Kanger testified that she feared how she and her
family would be treated if they returned to Latvia and her Jewish ancestry were revealed. 
She also explained that she was afraid to go back because her daughter had been called
names and a Star of David had been drawn on her backpack at school.  Mrs. Kanger
acknowledged that her mother spoke Yiddish, that she had buried her mother in a Jewish
cemetery in Latvia in 1985 and that the ceremony was conducted by a rabbi.  She
explained that her husband did not know she was Jewish though because he did not attend
the ceremony, choosing to wait outside the cemetery on the street.  According to Mrs.
Kanger, her husband paid the funeral invoice which bore the Star of David on it.  
    3As the IJ noted, the Kangers’ claims for asylum were not articulated with precision. 
Indeed, after the parties rested, the IJ decided to schedule closing statements so counsel
could “figure out . . . what you think the asylum claim in fact is in these cases.”  AR 567. 
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In a detailed and well-reasoned decision dated May 29, 2001, the IJ denied the
Kangers’ applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the CAT.  She
found that neither Mr. nor Mrs. Kanger was credible.  The IJ concluded that Mr. Kanger’s
claims of past persecution and future persecution based on anti-Semitism were not worthy
of belief, particularly in light of the country reports which indicate that there “is no longer
evidence of systemic harm against Jews in Latvia[.]”  In addition, the IJ found that Mr.
Kanger’s fear of retaliation by former KGB officials based on his knowledge of
corruption and his past involvement in the Latvian independence movement was
unreasonable in light of Latvia’s subsequent independence.  The IJ also rejected Mrs.
Kanger’s assertion that she only realized she was Jewish after arriving in the United
States and concluded that Mrs. Kanger had failed to meet her burden of demonstrating a
well-founded fear of persecution based on her Jewish heritage if returned to Latvia.  In
sum, the IJ recognized that the Kangers’ “claims changed over time,” belatedly seeking
asylum based on a fear of future persecution as a result of Mrs. Kanger’s Jewish heritage
and Mr. Kanger’s alleged perception as a Jew.3  She concluded that the Kangers had
failed to meet their burden of demonstrating persecution or a well-founded fear of
persecution and denied their applications for relief.
The BIA affirmed, “without opinion, the results of the [IJ’s] decision below.” AR
52.  Accordingly, the IJ’s decision became the final decision of removal and is subject to
review here pursuant to 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(b)(1) and 1252(a).  See Abdulrahman v.
Ashcroft, 330 F.3d 587, 591 (3d Cir. 2003); Abdulai v. Ashcroft, 239 F.3d 542. 549 n.2
(3d Cir. 2001).  Our review in an immigration matter is circumscribed.  We limit our
inquiry to ensuring that the IJ’s findings are supported by substantial evidence.  See, e.g.,
Gao v. INS, 299 F.3d 266, 272 (3d Cir. 2002) (“Whether an asylum applicant has
demonstrated past persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution is a factual
determination reviewed under the substantial evidence standard.”); Abdille v. Ashcroft,
242 F.3d 477, 483 (3d Cir. 2001).  We may reverse only where the evidence compels a
conclusion contrary to that of the IJ.  8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B) (“the administrative
findings of fact are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to
conclude to the contrary . . . .”); Abdille, 243 F.3d at 483-84 (citing INS v. Elias-Zacarias,
502 U.S. 478,  481 n.1 (1992)).
The substantial evidence standard also applies to adverse credibility
determinations.  Gao, 299 F.3d at 272.  Accordingly, an adverse credibility finding should
not be disturbed “unless ‘any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to
the contrary.’”  Id. (quoting Senathirajah v. INS, 157 F.3d 210, 216 (3d Cir. 1998)). 
Specific reasons should be given for finding a witness not credible and those “reasons
must bear a legitimate nexus to the finding.”  Balasubramanrim v. INS, 143 F.3d 157, 162
(3d Cir. 1998).   
6We conclude that the IJ’s adverse credibility determination with respect to both
Mr. and Mrs. Kanger is fully supported by the record.  The IJ appropriately considered the
entire record and identified numerous legitimate reasons for disbelieving the Kangers’
testimony that they each feared being perceived or identified as Jewish if returned to
Latvia.  Each of these reasons are supported by the record.  Because there is ample
evidence to support the IJ’s adverse credibility determinations and the denial of the
Kangers’ applications for asylum, withholding of removal and relief under the CAT, we
will affirm the final decision of the BIA and dismiss the petition for review.
______________________________________
TO THE CLERK:
Please file the foregoing Opinion.
By the Court:
  /s/ D. Brooks Smith               
Circuit Judge
